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Abstract 
The paper presents the Hobbesian case for multilateralism by combining a text analytical 
critique of Hobbes’ argument in favor of the Leviathan with its reassessment in a new security 
environment. The analysis shows that Hobbes’ premises are complex and lead to conclusions 
that differ from the realist as well as from the world-state position, both attributed to 
Hobbesian logic in IR theory. A strict application of the Hobbesian argument in today’s 
security context leads to a rationale of multilateral institution building among states. In the 
first part of the paper, the internationalist analogy in the concept of war of all against all is 
uncovered and analyzed in relation to the security dilemma, domestic analogy, and 
methodological individualism. Part II reassesses the Hobbesian security rationale in a new 
security environment which is assumed to be shaped by transnational terrorism and nuclear 
WMD. 
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0. Introduction 
This paper argues in favor of multilateralism from a Hobbesian standpoint. The position 
defended differs from the view that the Hobbesian argument in the Leviathan offers a 
rationale of the international anarchic system. Hobbes’ thesis that without common power 
there is no law and no injustice is indeed at the basis of a secular justification of the modern 
state. But his remarks on international relations are very brief and their understanding often 
requires conjectural reasoning in a wider theoretical context (Gauthier 1969: 207-12). It is 
therefore not surprising that some interpret the Hobbesian position on international relations 
in accordance with the realist paradigm of international anarchy (e.g. Waltz 1959; 
Morgenthau 1967; Smith 1986; Bull 1977; 1981; Vincent 1981), while others see in Hobbes’ 
argument in favor of the Leviathan a rationale for a world state.1 The realists see the existence 
of independent, armed, and potentially dangerous states as an irreducible, quasi-ontological 
fact (Willms 1989). The overarching paradigm is Hobbes’ influential remark that, due to lack 
of common power, the states exist in an anarchical state of “gladiators” (Hobbes 1962: 115). 
In this paper, I will first analyze the Hobbesian argument and show that Hobbes’ premises are 
complex and that the conclusions that have to be drawn from them differ from the anarchistic 
as well as from the world-state position. I will argue that a strict application of Hobbesian 
methodology leads to a rationale of multilateral cooperation and institution building among 
states to the utmost possible degree. 
The rejection of a territorial world Leviathan is based on the evidence that, to create a 
zone of peace, it suffices that all states evolve into democratic states and that they cooperate 
through multilateral institutions. Liberal democratic states need no Leviathan to keep the 
peace among them, but they do need multilateral institutions that govern their 
interdependence. Multilateralism is understood as cooperation of two or more states according 
to generalized principles of conduct. Credible commitment is established and cooperation 
stabilized by interlinked und functionally differentiated institutions which combine national, 
intergovernmental and supranational decision making or dispute settlement procedures 
(Ruggie 1993; Caporaso 1993; Cheneval 2006). There are of course many functional 
variations and institutional options of multilateralism that will not be analyzed here (Martin 
1993). We only argue in favor of a basic Hobbesian choice for multilateralism. The rationale 
of multilateralism does not exclude bilateralism. Bilateralism and multilateralism often come 
as a mix which can be explained rationally. The paper therefore does not argue for 
multilateralism in opposition to bilateralism. However, it is assumed that the system of peace 
and security sustained by domestic democracy, fundamental rights, and interdependence 
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among states cannot be upheld on a unilateral or bilateral basis only. In spheres in which the 
free rider problem arises, bilateral regulation and enforcement brings about unacceptable 
transaction costs which multilateralism considerably reduces (Rixen and Rohlfing 2005). The 
same is true regarding access to information and systemic transparency (Kratochwil 1993). 
Even intergovernmental military alliances, such as NATO, incorporate multilateral, i.e. 
generalized, principles of conduct, such as the principle of indivisibility (Weber 1993). The 
rationale of multilateral governance argued for in this paper also agrees with the reassessment 
of the role of sovereignty in a new system of close interdependence (Keohane 1995). But 
unlike authors stressing the “self-defeating nature” of Hobbes’ thought (Keohane 1995: 167-
171), this article proposes a different reading: Hobbesian realism actually supports the basic 
choice of multilateralism. Noel Malcolm (2002: 432-456) has shown that the realists invoking 
the authority of Hobbes miss the point that Hobbes’ general concept of international relations 
is one of cooperation and interaction between states at many levels. I agree with this finding, 
but will show that some problems in the standard version of the argument have to be brought 
to light and avoided in order to make the Hobbesian point in favor of multilateralism in a 
coherent manner. 
Besides exegetical and conceptual adaptations, an additional condition to the 
Hobbesian case in favor of multilateralism is put forward. In our times, the Hobbesian 
argument has to be reassessed in a security environment that is considerably different form 
the one known to Hobbes. Nuclear capacity with second strike capability and the networks of 
transnational terrorism influence the way that we can shape the Hobbesian security rationale 
(Kavka 1987). The increasing possibility for states, independent of size, to annihilate each 
other with WMDs changes some of the empirical assumptions of the Hobbesian argument. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of transnational terrorism reduces the security that states can 
guarantee to their citizens by controlling territory. The states’ control of their own territory 
has to be complemented by close transnational cooperation of territorial police, intelligence, 
and judicial authorities. The monopoly of power over a territory is no longer a reasonably 
sufficient guarantee for security. States have to seek a maximum of institutionalized 
cooperation in order to fulfill the security needs of the mobile and rational human individual. 
The two most important points of the complex text analytical part of the paper are the 
following: First, it will be shown that Hobbes draws his premise that no common power leads 
to a war of all against all from his image of international relations. He transposes this 
conception to a fictional state of nature among human individuals and concludes the 
rationality and necessity of a common state power. Thus, the argument in favor of the 
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monopoly of power among individuals who are all considered being at war with each other 
has to be checked against the fact that, in reality, human individuals always confront each 
other in groups and hardly ever as totally separated individuals. Hypothetical 
individualization is of course possible for the sake of counterfactual argumentation. Hobbes 
argument is in deed hypothetical, but his counterfactual hypothesis is the lack of common 
power among individuals. The proposition that the lack of common power leads to a war of 
all against all is an empirical affirmation of a causal relation. Unlike the “no common power” 
hypothesis per se, the causal claim that no common power leads to war of all against all does 
not have the status of a pure hypothesis in Hobbes’ argument. He gives empirical evidence for 
it. Since the position arguing that lack of common power leads to a war of all human 
individuals against all human individuals is highly unrealistic, it comes as no surprise that 
Hobbes tries to make his causal statement plausible by an internationalist analogy: states have 
no common power, that is why they have standing armies, border guards and are all in a 
posture of war with each other. But this is a consequence of the existence of sovereign states 
of a certain kind combined with the absence of common power among them. Therefore it 
cannot be a presupposition in a general justification of the state for human individuals. The 
war of all against all that really has to be avoided is the war among sovereign states and/or the 
war among factions, groups, etc. There is thus a necessity for state building but also for 
political institution building beyond the level of any particular human collective, be it a 
faction in the state or a state. 
This point is reinforced by giving attention to a second problem in Hobbes’ argument: 
Hobbes changes from a security rationale taking the perspective of the rational human 
individual to a collective security rationale form the point of view of the state. The anarchic 
situation among states is acceptable for states because the latter are defined as political 
entities that can survive in such an environment. But the point is that this environment is not 
acceptable for human individuals who are not free from fear of international war and who 
have no guarantee of safe movement in an international anarchic system. The relocation of the 
Hobbesian rationale in the point of view of the human individual triggers therefore an 
imperative for institution building among and above states to the utmost possible degree. 
The paper is divided in two parts. Part I presents the textual and logical analysis of the 
different aspects of the Hobbesian argument just mentioned. It starts with an analysis of the 
concept of the state of nature which is at the basis of the Hobbesian argument (I.1). In the 
following sections, two aspects of Hobbes’ justification of the state are uncovered: the 
internationalist origin of the concept of war of all against all (I.2) and the shift from an 
 6 
individualistic to a collective security rationale in the rejection of the imperative to overcome 
the state of nature among states (I.3). Part II reassesses the Hobbesian security rationale in a 
new security environment. A first paragraph is dedicated to the phenomenon of the trans-
territorialization of threat by terrorism and the cooperative institutional approach needed to 
respond to this phenomenon in order to meet the security interests of sedentary and mobile 
individuals (II.1). The second paragraph discusses the consequences of nuclear WMD and 
asks if the equality of states in mutual assured destruction (MAD) by nuclear second strike 
capability is comparable to the Hobbesian equality among individuals conceived as ability of 
all to kill each other (II.2). The third paragraph (II.3) summarizes the rationale of 
multilateralism and argues that a world state is not necessary in the context of a security 
environment of liberal peace and not possible in other realistic scenarios. At the end, the 
Hobbesian argument in favor of multilateral cooperation is summarized (III). 
 
I. Analysis of the Hobbesian Rationale of the State and International System 
I.1. Variations of the State of Nature 
Before approaching Hobbes argument in more detail, it is helpful to see that “state of nature”, 
a key concept in his argument, is analytical only with regard to the condition of absence of 
common power. Given further determinations, the concept actually divides into four different 
understandings, following a formal and material distinction. Formally, a historical/empirical 
understanding has to be distinguished from a hypothetical understanding of the state of nature 
(Boucher 1998: 145-157). Secondly, the state of nature may be conceived as a state of 
innocence and/or societal peace, at least in its original form. It may also be portrayed as a 
state of war. The formal and material distinctions of state of nature can be combined with 
each other so that we actually find four conceptions of the state of nature: as a historical state 
of war, as a hypothetical state of war, as a historical state of peace, and as a hypothetical state 
of peace. Further, there is a possibility of conceiving war as a war of all individuals against all 
individuals, or of peace of all individuals with all individuals. On the other hand, there is a 
state of war between collectives (groups, states, hords, factions, etc), or its peaceful 
equivalent. These possibilities can again be conceived as either hypothetical or historical: 
 
STATE OF NATURE hypothetical Historical 
snwar/individ snwar/individ/hyp snwar/indiv/hist 
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snwar/coll snwar/coll/hyp snwar/coll/hist 
snpeace/indiv snpeace/indiv/hyp snpeace/indiv/hist 
snpeace/coll snpeace/coll/hyp snpeace/coll/hist 
 
Hobbes was keen to give empirical evidence for his claim that the state of nature leads to a 
state of war, ultimately, of all against all. It has been argued that the reference to a negative 
anthropology in general, civil war, the Amazon women, the Saxon and other German tribes, 
the paternal communities of Ancient Greece, or the Amerindians have served as historical 
evidence for the state of nature (Boucher 1998: 157). Hobbes did indeed refer to all of these 
historical realities as examples of a historical state of nature as state of war. The problem, 
however, is that none of these examples give evidence of a state of war of all human 
individuals against all human individuals. In fact, many “primitive” tribes lead a peaceful and 
cooperative existence in the absence of a centralized Leviathan. Furthermore, civil war is war 
between limited numbers of factions, not a war of all human individuals against all human 
individuals. There might be ample evidence for the violent nature of humans, but there is no 
empirical evidence for a real state of war of all human individuals against all human 
individuals. 
A convincing argument has been made that the Amerindians offered important 
empirical evidence for the state of nature to 17th and 18th century authors. In the Americas the 
Europeans actually discovered the historical “state of nature” of earlier times in their 
contemporary reality (Jahn 1999). But the state of nature they discovered was not a state of 
war of all human individuals against all human individuals. It was a state of communitarian 
life or collective struggle. None of the historical examples of the state of nature were 
examples of a real war of all individuals against all individuals. 
It will first be shown that international relations are Hobbes’ empirical reference of a 
state of nature as state of war of all against all (snwar/indiv/hist). Hobbes replaced the collective 
individual (state) with the human individual and attributed the characteristics of the system of 
sovereign states to the situation of human individuals in a state of nature. 
 
I.2. The Internationalist Analogy in Hobbes’ “War of All against All” 
As Hobbes writes in the Dedicatory Letter of De cive, persons relate to each other in two 
fundamental ways: as citizens of the same state, or as states. In the state they are bound by 
love, justice, and peace. In the confrontation of states, even the good need to go to war, use 
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violence and deceit in order to ascertain their safety and survival. In the first case, man is 
man’s God, in the second case, man is man’s wolf.2 
First, it should be noticed that Hobbes does not say that man as such is man’s wolf. 
Only in the personification of the state and in the confrontation of states is man man’s wolf. 
This is related to the fact that the paradigm “war of all against all” has a 
statist/internationalist, not an individualist/domestic or general anthropological origin. Only in 
a second, fictional argument does it get applied to all human individuals. The passage referred 
to in De cive is representative for Hobbes’ parallel consideration of the state of nature among 
human individuals and states. As Hobbes notes, there are no human beings which do not exist 
under some kind of authority. Those who live without a modern state, like the Amerindians, 
do not live in a state of war of all against all. Hobbes’ state of nature as war of all human 
individuals against all human individuals is based on a metaphorical transposition of state 
attributes to individuals. All Hobbes can say about the savages that have no government is 
that they live in “brutish manner”. He does not and cannot claim that they live in a state of 
war of all individuals against all individuals.3 
Hobbes makes the causal claim that the absence of government (state of nature) leads 
to a state of war of all against all, of constant threat, fear, and violence. But all of this is 
formulated in the conjunctive form.4 However, Hobbes holds that the state of nature among 
states is not a hypothesis but an empirical reality. He refers to it in order to give empirical 
evidence for the causal claim that under conditions of absence of common power the relations 
between actors degenerate into a state of war of “every man against every man”.5 Hobbes 
does not conceive the state of nature among individuals first, in order to transpose it to 
international relations later. He conceives the state of nature as state of war of all against all 
using international relations as empirical evidence. He then projects the state of war of all 
against all among sovereign states into the hypothetical state of nature among human 
individuals. Only after this operation does he arrive at the thesis of a war of all against all 
among human individuals given the absence of common power. The sovereign state person 
actually has the negative freedom an individual has in the hypothetical state of nature. The 
constitution of states without common power leads to an international state of nature which is 
a state of actual or potential war between armed states. War is thus the price of natural 
individual freedom, which exists among sovereign state persons and is hypothetically 
assumed for individuals.6 Even when there is no actual war, the absence of common power 
leads all states to threaten each other by their armies and to spy on each other’s strategic 
intentions (Hobbes 1983: 159). 
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For illustrative purposes, it is helpful to remember that the paradigm of “war of all 
against all” has its origin in Plato’s Laws where it refers to the state of war of all states against 
all states. The application to other conflicts is derived from this image and follows later in 
Plato’s text: “I think he [the legislator] censured the stupidity of ordinary men, who do not 
understand that they are all engaged in a never-ending lifelong war against all other states … 
The legislator’s position would be that what most men call ‘peace’ is really only a fiction, and 
that in cold fact all states are by nature fighting an undeclared war against every other state”. 
(Plato. Laws, I; 625e-626°, 1970: 47). Three aspects of the analysis just presented can be 
distinguished: 
 
I.2.1 Problems of Circularity and Ambiguity 
In the original concept of war of all against all, the actors are independent states. The key to 
the understanding of the problematic part of Hobbes argument lies in the transposition of 
attributes of the state on the human individual. Hobbes argument relies on a metamorphosis of 
totally independent predatory states into human individuals who then found the state. The 
logical consequences of this shift of attribution are very important. Hobbes’ argument 
consisted mainly in the irrationality of the war of all against all in the state of nature and thus 
the necessity for a common power. But since the empirical reference of the image of a state of 
nature as state of war of all against all is the relation between sovereign states, the result of the 
argument, i.e. the necessity of the sovereign independent state, is at the same time the 
constitutive reason of international relations state of permanent war of all against all. Hobbes 
thus created a Gordian knot. The more he insisted on sovereignty and independence of the 
state in order to create civil peace and overcome the hypothetical war of all individuals 
against all individuals, the more he accentuated the real state of war of all states against all 
states. The result of the argument, the justification of the independent armed state, is 
concealed in the presupposition of the war of all against all. Since there is no empirical 
evidence for a war of all human individuals against all human individuals, the only realistic 
necessity to form a state is the necessity for collective actors, be they states or factions, to 
overcome the state of nature among each other. 
 
I.2.2 Evitability of the Security Dilemma? 
The hidden internationalist analogy thus explains why Hobbes’ security logic produces a 
dilemma, called security dilemma by John Herz (1950; 2003). A dilemma is a choice between 
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two equally undesirable, or a logical consequence of two logically impossible alternatives. A 
dilemma has no satisfactory solution. Logically this is so because the argument is locked in by 
the exclusion of a third possibility in the premise (p or non-p, “tertium non datur”). The 
solution to a dilemma is only made possible by the change of the premise, opening the way 
for a third possibility. Transposed to international relations this means the following: Under 
conditions of anarchy and lack of common power, states can seek their security through 
armament or without it. If they choose to arm, the uncertainty of their intent to others creates 
fear which leads others to enhance their military power. The result is a (possibly inadvertent) 
decrease of security of others (Jervis 1988: 317; Glaser 1992: 506-7) or of all (Lieber 1988: 5; 
Collins 1997: 12). If the states do not arm, their position is equally insecure because others 
might take advantage of their presumed weakness. Any of the two possible policies seems 
unsatisfactory; the consequences are equally negative and unintended by many or by all. In 
short, the security dilemma turns international relations into a classical tragedy (Collins 
1997). 
Constructivist theories challenge this account by the argument that social threats are 
constructed, not naturally given. Whether a security dilemma becomes operational or not 
depends on the internal nature of the states, the action taken by the states and the interaction 
between them (Wendt 1992: 405). This is a classical example of “tertium datur”, the solution 
to a dilemma. To constructivism, the options to arm or not to arm do not constitute a complete 
disjunction. There are other possibilities of state action. When actors encounter each other for 
the first time, there is no security dilemma in operation. Both being social constructions, there 
is neither anarchy nor hierarchy. States can engage in cooperative practices which consolidate 
trust and create a dynamic interest in peace. Such theories are in fact quite close to Hobbes 
himself. He presupposes that sovereigns should seek to realize natural law, which is identical 
with the law of nations, in their conduct of international relations if possible to the utmost 
possible degree (Hobbes 1962: 260). Natural law is always binding in foro interno 
(conscience). In external relations, it makes sense that men endeavor to realize natural law as 
far as possible. As elements of such conduct he mentions mutual accommodation or 
complaisance in order to foster peace and not to become guilty of war, the granting of pardon, 
abstinence from revenge, guarantee of safe conduct to mediators of peace, submission to 
arbitrement and avoidance to be judge in one’s own cause (Hobbes 1962: 118-122). 
International relations can though be constructed by something else than just predatory and 
counter-predatory behavior, but under conditions of lack of sufficient security the actors have 
to be prudent and they have the right to opt out from natural law. 
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The constructivist position has been criticized by pointing to the uncertainty of intent 
(Collins 1997). States might not necessarily start their relation in the security dilemma, but 
they get into it because of the a priori condition of uncertainty of intent. Nevertheless, how 
deep the states get into a state of “nature” depends on their actions. This point works in favor 
of the constructivist argument because the states can choose offensive or defensive weaponry, 
allow weapons inspections by supranational agencies, delegate the condition of possibility to 
make war and the informational expertise to supranational agencies, prove their motives 
through other confidence building measures, exercise self-restraint through internal 
democratic government, and/or rely on general communicative rationality (for the latter see 
Risse 2000; Mitzen 2005). In other words, the states can avoid the conditions of anarchy and 
of informational uncertainty. This solution, however, needs further qualification. 
According to Collins (2004: 35), a system-induced security dilemma, a state-induced 
security dilemma, and an imperialist security dilemma can be distinguished, whereby 
uncertainty is common to all. The system-induced security dilemma is based on the general 
conditions of anarchy or lack of common power, creating a climate of uncertainty among 
inoffensive status quo powers with tragic, i.e. negative consequences unintended by all. As 
mentioned above, there are many solutions for status quo powers to get out of the system-
induced security dilemma. By creating networks of mutually managed interdependence which 
are not themselves closed and territorial in the sense of the modern state, multilateralism leads 
out of the system-induced security dilemma without reproducing it on a higher level among 
ever greater Leviathans. The state-induced security dilemma applies if a hegemonic state 
actually requires the insecurity of others and thereby creates uncertainty (Snyder 1985). 
Collins sees the solution to this version of the security dilemma in combining threats and 
concessions to alter the hegemon’s requirements that others are insecure without challenging 
its dominant position. The imperialist security dilemma is state induced. However, the state in 
question is not a hegemon but a powerful revisionist aggressor who challenges the status quo 
and does not accept concessions nor react to threat. Whatever the further implications might 
be, two points are clear. A constructivist approach notwithstanding, for status quo states it is 
much more complex to escape from state induced security dilemma and from imperialist 
security dilemma than from a system induced security dilemma among each other. Secondly, 
in order to escape from the security dilemma’s common feature of uncertainty it is not 
sufficient to escape from system-induced security dilemma, one also has to escape from state-
induced and the imperialistic security dilemma.  
 12 
The internationalist origin of Hobbes’ argument for the Leviathan offers an 
explanation why the security dilemma occurs in Hobbesian realism: the states are created by 
individuals who are presupposed to behave like revisionist imperialistic states in the 
imperialistic security dilemma. The system-induced security dilemma and the possibilities of 
constructing a different social reality of international relations are being short-circuited by the 
metamorphosis of predatory states into human individuals and, subsequently, predatory 
human individuals into predatory states. Hobbes generalized a state of affairs that is not 
general, but that is never the less quite real. Status quo states can overcome the system-
induced security dilemma among themselves and govern their relations by institution building 
based on the law of nature, but they cannot easily overcome the security dilemma induced by 
imperialistic and revisionist third states. However, facing this reality, they can institutionalize 
and stabilize cooperation and thereby avoid the costs of the system-induced security dilemma 
among themselves, and they can join forces and create an effective multilateral system that 
diminishes the general incentives for hegemony and imperialism. 
 
I.2.3. The Domestic Analogy is not Domestic 
The proposed reading of Hobbes also leads to the need for a revision of the understanding of 
the domestic analogy as interpreted by the realist tradition (Bull 1977: 45-6; Suganami 1989). 
The domestic analogy has been explained by Ch. Bottici (2003) as an equality of 
relationships: the relation of states in international relations is to be seen in analogy to the 
relation of individuals in the domestic realm. Bottici identifies three conditions of 
applicability of the analogy: First, the acceptance of sovereignty as distinctive trait of state 
actors. This difference keeps the analogy an analogy. If the domestic and international realms 
were identical, analogical reasoning would be inadequate (Kratochwil 1993: 464). Second: the 
possibility of extension of knowledge and experience of individuals in domestic society to the 
relation between states. For instance, the conditions of peace and justice in international 
relations are presumed to be conceivable by transposing parts of the experience of state-
building to the international realm. Third: the existence of a significant number of similarities 
between the two domains. 
This analysis has shown that in a Hobbesian rationale of international relations the 
domestic analogy is preceded by an internationalist analogy. The paradigm for the state of war 
of all against all under anarchy, overcome through state-building, is the relation between 
sovereign states. In Hobbes, the domestic and international realities and the human and state 
individuals have been largely interchanged. This point does not undermine normative and 
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methodological individualism as such. But it does reveal that a Hobbesian domestic analogy 
relies on a hidden internationalist analogy. The internationalist analogy, on the other hand, is 
not adequate for individualistic contractarianism, because the war of all human individuals 
against all human individuals is unrealistic. It can by hypothesized, but what good is an 
unrealistic hypothesis? What seems sensible, though, is the analogy of the confrontation of 
states with each other with the confrontation of factions in civil war. Both require adequate 
domestic and multilateral institution building to overcome the conditions leading to general 
insecurity for individuals. Granted, the “quality” of the international state of nature depends 
of the nature of the sovereigns. Some will seek to implement natural law and are thus not 
predatory. They also keep internal societal order and thereby change the nature of the external 
order among societies. But insofar as Hobbes relies on the worst case scenario of predatory 
sovereigns who are in a posture of war against each other and transposes this worst case 
scenario to human individuals, he exchanges the domestic analogy for an internationalist 
analogy. 
 While it is true that the state of nature as state war of all human individuals against all 
human individuals lacks empirical evidence, it is equally true that a civil war of a limited 
number of factions creates a state of insecurity for all human individuals. This state of 
insecurity for all does not require the hypothesis of a war of all against all and empirical 
evidence can easily be found to confirm it. Couldn’t Hobbes’ argument be adapted 
accordingly: The state of nature being a state of insecurity for all requires a social contract 
that establishes civil peace? This argument is convincing and supports the point: The 
international state of nature leads to a state of insecurity for all human individuals as they are 
living in a system where war is constantly possible and free movement of individuals is 
insecure. The creation of a monopoly of state power is therefore not a sufficient measure to 
overcome the state of insecurity of all. 
 
I.3. Switching from an Individual to a Collective Security Rationale 
In De cive, Hobbes clearly states that he who claims to want to remain in the state of nature 
contradicts himself.7 Hobbes does not apply this to citizens of different states and states. The 
imperative to overcome the state of nature by a social contract is not as unconditional as 
Hobbes suggests when he refers to the self-defeating character of the state of nature. He only 
justifies a brotherhood of arms, structured internally in such a way as to oppose enemies. The 
equality of human individuals as equal capacity to kill each other (Hobbes 1983: 45) is being 
modified by the foundation of the state. With fellow citizens there is justified hope to 
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conserve life and property; in the state of nature this seems impossible.8 With a sufficient 
number of fellow citizens there is hope for the survival of the collective and in the collective.9 
Interstate war is seen as a controlled action following formal rules.10 Certainly the lesser evil 
when compared to the wars of gangs and warlords (Gover 1989: 80). Hobbes thinks that 
international war is conducive for state-building and virtue.11 On the level of international 
relations, Hobbes gives his individualistic security rationale a collectivist turn. He holds that it 
is sufficient to enter in a contract with some. This leads to common strength to oppose other 
collectives.12 
If Hobbes were to apply the same individualistic security logic to the domestic and 
international realm, and if he conceded that real war is always among states or collectives, he 
would have to say that citizens of different states (or members of different collectives) willing 
to stay in a state of nature with each other contradict themselves. If one applies the original 
logic of Leviathan, i.e. one argues strictly from the point of view of the human individual as a 
rational actor seeking conditions of survival, the imperative to overcome or avoid the state of 
nature among states and among citizens of different states applies. It is obvious that, while 
acceptable for some states under some conditions, the international state of nature is not 
acceptable for human individuals, especially when they are considered as transnationally 
mobile. The international state of nature leaves the human individual in fear of death in 
international war and in fear of death or uncertain protection as mobile agent. From a strictly 
individualistic point of view, the international state of nature does not fulfill the condition of 
sufficient security. If we give Hobbes argument an individualistic turn back to the human 
individual, this triggers a rational imperative to overcome the state of nature among states and 
citizens of different states as far as possible. This brings the Hobbesian logic based on natural 
right in line with his constructivist approach regarding the realization of natural law in 
international relations. 
 
 
II. The Hobbesian Argument in a New Security Environment 
In this section it is shown that the imperative to multilateralism following from a reshaped 
Hobbesian argument is reinforced in the new security environment. Hobbesian realism was 
part of an early modern reality when “war made the state, and the state made war” (Tilly 
1975: 42). His reluctance to challenge the international state of nature has to be interpreted 
within a context before world wars, long range WMD, massive bombardments of civilians, 
suicidal transnational terrorism, possibly with WMD. Wars of the highly industrialized world 
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and transnational terrorism bring about a state of insecurity for states and individuals, unheard 
of at the time of Hobbes. Today, even times of peace and democratic stability in a good 
number of states are times of high insecurity. L. F. Richardson’s seminal “Variation of the 
Frequency of Fatal Quarrels with Magnitude” (1948: 523-46; 1960) falsified Hobbes’ 
argument that it is always beneficial to trade off frequent civil war against less frequent 
interstate war. If wars increase in severity by a factor of ten, they occur less frequently only 
with a factor of three. This confirms Rousseau’s argument against Hobbes that the world 
becomes a more dangerous place if mankind only goes half way and creates sovereign states 
without going further to creating a federative system among them (Rousseau 1964: 604). 
Moreover, transnational terrorism brings insecurity into stable democratic states even in the 
absence of interstate or civil war. Transnational terrorism spreads according to its own laws 
(i.e. neither territorial contiguity, nor state alignment) and breaks a conflict into violent events 
of low or high severity and frequency creating a general state of insecurity (Pearlstein 2004). 
 
II.1 Trans-territorial Threat 
Facing terrorism under advanced technological conditions of communication and mobility, 
people are unsafe in their democratic homeland, even in the absence of interstate and civil 
war. Given mobility and economic interdependence, the vital interests of a state and its 
citizens may also be damaged abroad, on the territory of another country. Just like anarchy 
might be too vague a concept to explain particular wars (Cederman 2003: 145), so civil order 
in the powerful Leviathan is not a sufficient condition for particular security. The crucial 
question from a radically Hobbesian point of view is if this state of insecurity for all is 
sufficiently overcome by the existence of the territorial sovereign state. Facing global 
terrorism, the existence of a certain number of stable, decent, and even democratic states 
seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for internal security. 
If it is true that in our times the state of insecurity for all within a given territory is not 
sufficiently overcome by the existence of the territorial state – the contested term “war on 
terror” against an enemy outside and inside state borders seems to indicate just that –, then 
Hobbes’ pragmatic and statist reasons not to submit classical internationalism to the 
individualistic, and consequently multilateral, logic of political institution building no longer 
hold the same weight. This in turn means that the logical form of the original individualistic 
argument of the social contract is again relevant: from an individualistic point of view, the 
international state of nature which perpetuates a state of insecurity for all individuals is self-
contradictory or at least highly problematic. While the states prevail, individuals remain or are 
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increasingly unsafe. In the age of global terrorism and the sovereign importance of movement, 
states need to cooperate very closely in order to assure better individual security within there 
territory (Barthelmess 2002). In Hobbesian terms, they should not just respect natural law, but 
they should follow reason in forming institutional frameworks leading to a higher degree of 
security. 
 
II.2 Egalitarian Consequences of WMD? 
In the early stages of nuclear armament, Bertrand Russell applied Hobbes’ concept of 
sovereignty through domination to international relations (Russell 1945: 541). Given the 
nuclear monopoly of the USA at that time, he considered a nuclear blackmail or annihilation 
of the Soviet Union and any other power opposed to American world government. Russell 
reluctantly contemplated to “save the world” and end the international state of anarchy by 
nuclear imperialism of the USA: “There is one thing and only one which could save the 
world, and that is a thing which I should not dream of advocating. It is, that America should 
make war on Russia during the next two years, and establish a world empire by means of the 
atomic bomb.”13 
As the USSR developed second strike capability, some argued that the conditions of 
MAD made it necessary to apply Hobbes’ concept of rational consensus and equality to the 
states that now had the capability of totally destroying each other. It would therefore be 
rational for all states to abandon nuclear weapons and to submit all nuclear capacity to a 
common civil authority, just like the European powers have submitted the industries of coal 
and steel to the European Coal and Steel Community after World War II. This has not (yet) 
become reality and the powers seem to have a collective action problem. The explanation that 
has been given is that the Hobbesian model is a retrospective genetic explanation, inadequate 
to serve as a decision making tool or to predict prospective collective action (Kavka 1987). 
Daniel Farrell argued that also under strict rationality conditions the nuclear powers have no 
real interest to submit to a common supranational authority, not even under conditions of 
MAD (Farrell 1989: 64-77). He conceived the equality of states as a traditional balance of 
power and therefore did not think that MAD leads to a fundamentally new situation (1989: 
68-9). Farrell did not work with Hobbes’ concept of equality as equal ability to annihilate. 
Second strike capability however creates equality between states in the sense of equal 
capability to annihilate. Equality according to Hobbes means that everybody can annihilate 
everybody. 
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MAD has lead nuclear powers, democratic or non-democratic, not to attack each other 
and, with limited success, to keep others from developing nuclear arms. It can thus be argued 
that MAD assures peace among rationally behaving powers with nuclear second strike 
capability. It can also be argued that MAD is not really comparable to Hobbes’ concept of 
equality among individual human beings, because the individual is, in most cases, not able to 
strike back before being killed. There is no possibility of a MAD among individuals. In this 
sense, the comparison between MAD and Hobbesian equality is inadequate. However, three 
further arguments have to be considered: 1) It is contradictory to argue for non-submission to 
a supranational nuclear authority in the name of the peace keeping consequences of MAD (a) 
and at the same time prohibit nuclear proliferation (b). According to (a), states can argue (or 
reason in secrecy) that they have to join the countries with nuclear second strike capability in 
order to assure security and peace. 2) A stabilized state of MAD, ideally assuring peace, has 
to be distinguished from the dangerous consequences of the race to obtain atomic weapons, 
driven by the desire to obtain “nuclear sovereignty”. This race can drive states into war as 
they preemptively try to hinder other states from obtaining nuclear weapons, or as they try to 
reach other objectives by military means before the enemy state has obtained the possibility to 
reply to attack with nuclear weapons. 3) The third argument considers the possible 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to suicidal terrorists. This argument might be somewhat 
more difficult to uphold due to the complicated technology involved. But there can be 
scenarios in which suicidal terrorists get technological cooperation from rogue states. These 
three arguments show that it does not suffice to point to the peaceful consequences of an ideal 
state of MAD in order to argue against the general abolition of nuclear weapons and 
submission of all nuclear activity to a civil supranational authority. The lack to do so might 
result in disaster and, under conditions of interdependence, is unacceptable for any self-
interested rational individual or state. 
 
II.3 Why Multilateralism and not a World-Leviathan 
The overcoming the “state of nature” among states implies the necessity of multilateralism 
but not of a world-Leviathan. As has been said, multilateralism can be understood as 
functionally differentiated constitution of incongruent territorial hierarchies through 
institutionalized cooperation and integration between states. The multilateral process blends 
domestic and intergovernmental structures through their linkage to supranational modes of 
decision-making, dispute settlement, and jurisdiction. Today, multilateralism is a 
geographically limited network of overlapping and territorially incongruent organizations, not 
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an overarching global system. In the world at large, it coexists with traditional international or 
statist structures, with feedback loops of sub-state or ethnic fragmentation, with failed states 
or with the total absence of modern statehood. The global application and the “finality” of 
multilateralism is uncertain. But as a process towards a more comprehensive transnational 
guarantee of peace, security, rule of law, individual autonomy through increased possibility of 
transnational movement we can consider multilateralism a systemic necessity of modern 
society. It is the adequate choice of the rational human individual. With regard to new threats 
it is increasingly difficult for states to maintain a level of sufficient security without 
cooperation. The security perspectives of individuals and states begin to coincide in showing 
the necessity of multilateral institution building beyond the state level: “Networked threats 
require a networked response” (Slaughter 2005: 36). 
Multilateralism guarantees increased security through shared responsibility between 
domestic, intergovernmental, and supranational institutions. It is therefore not a process of 
reproduction of the unitary state at a higher level. This also implies that multilateralism does 
not reproduce the security-dilemma at a higher level. Neither is it a process of territorial 
monopolization of power, but of limited, differentiated delegation of competence to 
supranational agents and of intergovernmentalism in the areas where states cooperate but 
retain full or shared decision-making power. States, especially the powerful ones, continue to 
be the single most important political actors. However, many of them pursue some of their 
goals through negative integration (differentiated abolition of tariffs, border control), 
differentiated delegation of competence to supranational dispute settlement, regulatory agents 
and, in the case of the EU, even to legislative bodies. Overall, sovereignty remains important. 
But sovereignty and the traditionally unitary and holistic character of borders are being 
unbundled (Ruggie 1993a, p. 164). Borders and decision-making powers are increasingly 
differentiated and reconnected at the intergovernmental level leading to institutional forms of 
non-unitary political and legal authority. Multilateralism presupposes state-building as it is 
initiated and carried out by states. But multilateralism also helps state-building and economic 
development as the perspectives of joining multilateral institutions offers incentives for 
political and economic reforms leading to more stable statehood (Fierke and Wiener 1999; 
Vachudova 2001; Schimmelfennig/Engert/Knobel 2003). This can be done successfully 
already by small number of states forming core groups (Kahler 1993). 
The point against the world state on Hobbesian grounds can be argued on the basis of 
the comments made on the security dilemma and in the light of the theory of democratic or 
liberal peace. According to the theory of liberal peace, it is rational from an individualistic 
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point of view that states seek increased economic interdependence and govern this 
interdependence through multilateral institutions of mutual recognition and credible 
commitment. With regard to the state-induced and imperialistic security dilemmas it has been 
argued that they leave the status quo powers with no options than to cooperate with each other 
and to engage in collective security measures against non-status quo powers. If all powers are 
status-quo powers, the world would be left with a system-induced security dilemma that can 
be dealt with on the basis of multilateralism. Democratic state building and multilaterally 
governed interdependence of democratic states offer a sufficient guarantee for security among 
status quo powers. The theory of democratic or liberal peace has to be understood correctly to 
make this point clear. There is a consensus that the hypothesis of democratic peace can be 
upheld empirically if the combination of three elements is given: 1) representative democracy; 
2) guarantee of basic human rights; 3) transnational interdependence (Doyle 2005). Several 
empirical analyses have tested if every single element in isolation is a sufficient explanation 
for peace. The result is clear: If the elements are not realized in combination, the hypothesis 
of democratic peace can be falsified (Rosato 2003). Only the triadic variation of hypothesis of 
democratic or liberal peace can be upheld (Russett and O’Neill 2001; Doyle 2005). This 
variation considers “multilateralized” states which, in addition to their internal democratic 
system, respect universal human rights and are part of a complex system of interdependence. 
Both, the human rights system and the functional systems of interdependence are upheld and 
managed by multilateral institutions. The “zone of peace” of the democratic OECD world is a 
zone not only of individual democratic states existing next to each other, but of a highly 
complex web of multilateral institutions which create, uphold, and manage human rights 
regimes and regimes of functional interdependence. As long as this situation is not global and 
large zones of conflict and arbitrary rule persist, the world state is possible only at the 
rationally unacceptable cost of “bellum maximum”, as 18th century cosmopolitan thought has 
already brought to light (Cheneval 2005: 226). If all or most states were stable democracies 
forming a multilateral and interdependent world, the world state would no longer be necessary 
since peace and security are sustained realities among interdependent liberal democratic states 
interconnected via multilateral institutions. In nutshell, the conditions that make the world 
state possible are at the same time conditions that make it unnecessary. 
 
III. Conclusion: The Multilateral Logic of Hobbesian Realism 
We have first argued that Hobbes’ rational justification of the state and international system is 
complex. In his argument, the causal affirmation that no common power leads to a war of all 
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against all is taken from the evidence of international reality. It is transposed to domestic 
reality where it serves to justify a strong central state to check predatory individuals. 
However, the real state of war that threatens the security of individuals is always a state of 
war among collectives, a situation which the sheer formation of sovereign states perpetuates. 
To this reflection we added a second analytical element showing that, in his international 
thought, Hobbes switches from an individualistic to a statist security rationale which does not 
sufficiently address the security concerns of human individuals, especially not in a context of 
transnational mobility. The anarchic system of states is rationally unacceptable to human 
individuals in the case of available options of multilateral cooperation among states. The 
Hobbesian imperative is thus that states ought to go as far as they possibly can in establishing 
a multilateral zone of peace which guarantees individual security. This imperative has always 
been included in Hobbes’ natural law. But we have shown that it is also the result of a 
security calculus within the realm of natural right. 
The new security environment, mainly shaped by transnational terrorism and WMD, 
reinforces the understanding of the Hobbesian argument in its more coherent form and to 
pursue the security rationale from the point of view of the rational human individual. The 
unilateral insisting on national security and national interest of any state only ties the Gordian 
knot of the international war of all against all a little tighter. In the age of long range WMD 
and transnational terrorism the international state of “nature” becomes definitely 
unacceptable. The threats are such that they cannot be dealt with by an internal contract and 
unilateral posture of war towards the rest of the world. It goes without saying that under 
terrorist threat domestic order through the rule of law and law enforcement remains of 
primordial importance. However, it is insufficient if it is not backed by a system of close 
cooperation among states and the abolition of the conditions of possibility of elementary 
threat. Terrorism can be regarded as the trans-territorialization of war, threatening even strong 
states asymmetrically. Asymmetric threat means that not the state as such is threatened, but 
that its citizens are highly unsafe. Countries traditionally safe due to their power and strategic 
position are vulnerable unless their security is guaranteed at home and abroad. Technology 
has increased the possible harm that can be afflicted on people by individuals. Economic 
interdependence, world trade, globalized tourism and business all lead to the fact that a state’s 
interests and citizens can be threatened more easily at home and abroad. The nation-state-
Leviathan offers no sufficient shield against this threat even if it goes to its limits to guarantee 
a maximum of internal and border security. 
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The Leviathan controlling the world by a central state remains undesirable and 
ultimately unnecessary. The building of ever more powerful and larger states does not 
overcome but reproduce the security dilemma on ever higher scales. In order to achieve 
security for states and mobile individuals there is thus no realistic alternative to integrated 
forms of legislation and law enforcement through mechanisms of shared and unbundled 
sovereignty and coordinated political authority of different states. When centered on the 
human individual’s interest for security and survival, Hobbes’ argument suggests a 
multilaterally stabilized system of security and interdependence that goes well beyond the 
homeland. 
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1 Russell 1945: 541: “Every argument that he [Hobbes] adduces in favour of government, in 
so far as it is valid at all, is valid in favour of international government”. See Hungerland 
1989: 35-50; Mohrs 1995: 257-401. 
2 Hobbes 1983: 24: „To speak impartially, both sayings are very true; That Man to Man is a 
kind of God; and that Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe: The first is true, if we compare Citizens 
amongst themselves; and the second, if we compare Cities. In the one, there’s some analogie 
of similitude with the Deity, to wit, Justice and Charity, the twin-sisters of peace. But in the 
other, Good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a Sanctuary the two daughters 
of War, Deceipt and Violence“. 
3 Hobbes 1962: 101: “It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor 
condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there 
are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America … 
have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before”. 
4 Hobbes 1962: 101: “Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, 
where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life, which men that have 
formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a civil war”. 
5 “But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of 
war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of 
their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; 
having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, 
garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their 
neighbors; which is a posture of war. ...To this war of every man, against every man, this also 
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is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice 
have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law.” (Hobbes 1962: 115). 
6 “The liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention … is not the liberty of 
particular men; but the liberty of the commonwealth: which is the same with that which every 
man then should have, if there were no civil laws, nor commonwealth at all. And the effects 
of it also be the same. For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of every man 
against his neighbour … so in states, and commonwealths not dependent on one another, 
every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is 
to say, what that man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing to their 
benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of a perpetual war, and upon the confines of 
battle, with their frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbors round about.” 
(Hobbes 1962: 162). 
7 “Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all 
things were lawfull for all men, he contradicts himself; for every man, by naturall necessity 
desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that esteems a war of all against all, which 
necessarily adheres to such a State, to be good for him “. (Hobbes 1983: 49-50). 
8 “there is no man who can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himself from 
destruction, without the help of confederates”. (Hobbes 1962: 115). 
9 “It is therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained, that the 
number of them who conspire in a mutuall assistance be so great, the the accession of some 
few to the enemies party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the 
victory”. (Hobbes 1983 : 86). See also Hobbes 1962: 130. 
10 “And we mean such a war as is of all men against all men; such as is the meer state of 
nature; although in the warre of nation against nation a certain mean was wont to be 
observed“ (Hobbes 1983: 86). 
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11 “they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it, that 
misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men” (Hobbes 1962: 101). See 
McPherson 1962: 104. 
12 “And so it happens that through feare of each other we think it fit to rid our selves of this 
condition, and to get some fellows; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet be against 
all men, nor without some helps”. (Hobbes 1983 : 50). 
13 Letter from Russel to Gamel Brenan, 1 Sept 1945, quoted in Lippincott 1990: 21. 
